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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FORMER JEOPARDY-RETRIAL FOR GREATER OF-
FENSE AFTER CONVICTION OF LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE REVERSED ON AP-
PEAL-Defendant was indicted by the District of Columbia grand jury on 
counts charging both arson and murder in the first degree for a death 
caused by the arson. He was convicted of arson and second-degree murder,1 
the jury returning no verdict on the first-degree murder charge. On appeal 
the conviction of second-degree murder was reversed2 because the evidence 
permitted only a conviction of first-degree murder or an acquittal.3 On 
remand defendant was retried on the original indictment for first-degree 
·murder, convicted, and sentenced to death over his objection of former 
jeopardy. The court of appeals, sitting en bane, affirmed the conviction 
6-to-3.4 On appeal to the Supreme Court, held, reversed, four justices dis-
senting. Defendant had been placed in double jeopardy in violation of 
the Fifth Amendment.5 Green v. United States, 3!55 U.S. 184 (1957). 
The preliminary question faced by the Court was whether defendant 
had been acquitted of first-degree murder in his original trial, as a finding 
that he had not been acquitted could result in subjecting him to retrial after 
appeal.6 Had the jury been asked to return an express verdict, it would of 
necessity have been one of "not guilty"; thus the verdict had the effect of 
acquitting the defendant. Nevertheless, the jury found him guilty of every 
element necessary to convict him of a felony-murder, both the arson and the 
death, 7 and the failure to return a guilty verdict can rationally be explained 
only by jury reluctance tQ impose the mandatory death sentence. Thus the 
meaning of the verdict would not seem to be an acquittal. While perhaps an 
acquittal should be implied when the meaning of the verdict is doubtful,8 
when mercy is the only explanation for failure to find defendant guilty of 
the greater offense, implying an acquittal runs counter to a fair interpreta-
tion of the facts.9 
1 In the District of Columbia second-degree murder is a lesser included offense which 
may be proved under an indictment charging first-degree murder. Green v. United 
States, (D.C. Cir. 1955) 218 F. (2d) 856. 
2 Green v. United States, note 1 supra, noted in 41 VA. L. REv. 385 (1955). 
3 The felony-murder rule furnished the basis for the first-degree murder charge. 
The government could not prove that the defendant burned the building with the 
intent to kill necessary to establish second-degree murder. 
4 Green v. United States, (D.C. Cir. 1956) 236 F. (2d) 708. 
5 U.S. CONST., Amend. V: " ••. nor shall any person be subject for the same offense 
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb .... " 
6 The majority makes clear, however, that whether or not an acquittal is implied, 
the fact that the jury was discharged without returning a verdict on the first-degree 
murder charge and without defendant's consent is sufficient to support a plea of former 
jeopardy within the doctrine of Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949) (dictum). Principal 
case at 191. 
7 D.C. Code (1951) §22-2401: "Whoever ..• without purpose so to do kills another 
in perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate any arson . . • is guilty of murder in the 
first degree." 
8 See 66 YALE L. J. 592 (1957). 
9See 14 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 228 (1957). 
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The more significant problem faced by the Court was whether defend-
ant's appeal of his conviction for the lesser offense waived his right to 
plead former jeopardy to the greater. This question was faced by the 
Court in Trono v. United States,1° a Philippine Islands case involving a 
statute11 similar in wording to the Fifth Amendment. The defendant there 
was held subject to retrial in a five-to-four opinion, with four majority 
justices arguing that by appeal defendant had waived his right to plead 
former jeopardy as to the "whole controversy." Justice Holmes concurred in 
the result only, and a previous dissenting opinion12 indicated that he be-
lieved that jeopardy continued until the .final disposition of the case, in-
cluding appeal and retrial, so that defendant was never placed in jeopardy 
a second time.13 While the entire Court treated the case as if it involved the 
Fifth Amendment, and subsequent dicta approved it,14 the majority in the 
principal case did not find it controlling.15 They therefore regarded the 
question as open under the Fifth Amendment, although 36 state courts had 
passed on it,16 and refused to find a waiver. State courts which have re-
jected the waiver analysis in this context have usually done so on the 
grounds that the appeal, which is the basis of waiver, is directed only at 
the lesser offense; the first-degree murder question simply is not raised on 
appeal.17 The majority in the principal case, however, argued that "the 
law should not, and in our judgment does not" require the defendant to 
"barter his constitutional protection against a second prosecution for an 
•.. appeal from an erroneous conviction of another offense,"18 thus ap-
parently importing concepts of fundamental fairness into the double 
jeopardy clause. Whether retrial in this case was unfair to defendant is 
at least doubtful. His appeal was based on the proposition that he should 
have been tried only for fust degree murder. He was aware that he faced 
a mandatory death sentence if he was convicted on retrial after a successful 
appeal.19 Further, any convicted defendant given less than the maximum 
10 199 U.S. 521 (1905). 
11 32 Stat. 692 (1902): " ••• [N)o person for the same offense shall ,be twice put in 
jeopardy of punishment. . • ." 
12 Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 at 134 (1904). 
13 These same two arguments have been adopted as the rationale for permitting 
retrial of the defendant on the same offense after his successful appeal. As to waiver see, 
e.g., United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896); State v. McCord, 8 Kan. 232 (1871); Smith 
v. State, 196 Wis. 102, 219 N.W. 270 (1928). As to continuing jeopardy see, e.g., State 
v. Palko, 122 Conn. 529, 191 A. 320 (1937), affd. 302 U.S. 319 (1937). 
14 See Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344 at 378 (1906); Stroud v. United States, 
251 U.S. 15 at 18 (1919). Cf. Brantley v. Georgia, 217 U.S. 284 (1910). 
15 The majority also attempted to distinguish the case by holding it to be a product 
of the Spanish system of jurisprudence prevailing in the Philippine Islands. See note 
criticizing this distinction in 66 YALE L. J. 592 (1957). 
16 See cases collected in note 4, principal case at 216-218. Nineteen states permit 
retrial for the greater offense while seventeen do not. 
17 See, e.g., Brennan v. People, 15 Ill. 511 (1854). 
18 Principal case at 193. 
19 Green v. United States, note I supra, at 859. 
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sentence faces this same "incredible dilemma" when he appeals for a new 
trial, and the Court has specifically held that when a defendant convicted 
of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment appeals, wins 
a reversal, and on retrial is convicted and sentenced to death, the double 
jeopardy clause is not violated.20 More fundamentally, it is doubtful that 
due process fairness concepts are relevant at all in this area. Under English 
common law neither appeal nor retrial was permitted.21 The framers, 
however, apparently felt that appeal and retrial should be permitted to 
the defendant,22 and this conclusion was generally accepted by the early 
American cases.23 It therefore seems probable that the double jeopardy 
clause was intended to have no application to any case in which the de-
fendant appealed an adverse verdict. The common law prohibition was 
designed to assure that no man would continually be vexed for the same 
offense, but when continued vexation is of his own choosing, the con-
stitutional safeguard no longer seems applicable. Precedent, logic, and the 
interests of society in enforcing its criminal laws would therefore indicate 
a contrary result in this case. 
Ralph E. Boches 
20 Stroud v. United States, note 14 supra. 
21 Even now the English Court of Criminal Appeals generally lacks the power to 
order a new trial after reversing a conviction. See principal case at 203. 
22 See 1 ANNALS OF CONG., Gale's Comp., p. 753 (1834). 
23 See principal case at 189, 202, 203. 
